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**UNCLAS SXX/INT**

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SUBJ: BASIC 166 296 300 432  
TAKE 1 OF 3 -- STINGERS, BLOWPIPES HAD 'NO IMPACT' ON AFGHAN WAR  
PI231601  
LONDON JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY IN ENGLISH 25 JUL 87 PP 154-155  
((YOSSEF BODANSKY ARTICLE: "SAMS IN AFGHANISTAN: ASSESSING THE  
IMPACT"))

IMPACT)) ((TEXT)) SINCE MID-1986, THE AFGHANISTAN RESISTANCE HAS SHOT DOWN A FAR LARGER NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS THAN EVER BEFORE. OVER THE SAME PERIOD, HOWEVER, THE FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN HAS BEEN PUSHED BY THE SOVIET-DRA FORCES ONTO AND BEYOND THE PAKISTANI BORDER. THE RESISTANCE HAS LOST WHATEVER LITTLE TACTICAL INITIATIVE IT HAD AND CURRENTLY IS COMPLETELY ON THE DEFENSIVE.

THE RESISTANCE PRIMARILY REACTS TO SOVIET-DRA PROVOCATIONS OR DEFENDS ITS VITAL ASSETS AND SANCTUARIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE DURAND LINE. THEREFORE, ONE MUST ASSUME THAT THE MOUNTING LOSSES OF AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS HAS HAD LITTLE OR NO IMPACT ON THE PROGRESS OF SOVIET STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS HOW SURPRISED THE SOVIETS WERE BY THE INTRODUCTION OF AIR DEFENCE WEAPONS LIKE STINGER AND BLOWPIPE. THERE WAS A SUDDEN INCREASE IN LOSSES OF SOVIET AND AFGHAN AIRCRAFT, BUT IT DID NOT LAST LONG. ONCE THE SOVIETS GOT OVER THE SHOCK, THEY

THE PRIMARY SOVIET ANTI-SAN TACTIC IS TO CAPTURE THEM. THE SOVIETS WILL USE THEIR IRREGULAR WARFARE TO INCLUDE DEDICATED

...THE MISSILE SUPPLIES AND  
...STINGERS AND  
...ONCE THE  
...FORCE-LAUNCH RAIDS  
...EMPLOYMENT  
...WITHIN  
...THE  
...THE

THE SOVIET-DRG FORCE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1967 ALL THE  
...RESISTANCE STATIONS AND BASES RESULTED IN  
...SEVERAL HUNDRED PRISONERS AND SEVERAL RESISTANCE  
...AND THAT SEVERAL HUNDREDS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED.  
...THE SOVIET-DRG HAVE INTENSIFIED ATTACKS  
...ON THE RESISTANCE STATIONS AND BARRACKS. THEY HAVE STARTED  
...CONCENTRATING ON CARAVANS CARRYING COMPLEX WEAPONS AS WELL AS  
...RESISTANCE COMMANDERS AND DOCUMENTS. THE LOSS RATIO OF RESISTANCE  
...TO THE EFFICIENCY OF THE SOVIET  
...ATTACKS.

ON 31 MAY 1967, THE SOVIET KRAVAYA ZVEZDA PUBLISHED A DETAILED  
...ACCOUNT OF SUCH AN ATTACK IN THE LONGAR PROVINCE. A LARGE CARAVAN  
...WAS IDENTIFIED BY AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. A SOVIET-DRG FORCE STORMED  
...IT AND AMONG THE LARGE QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS CAPTURED WERE "56  
...FOREIGN-MADE PORTABLE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE LAUNCHERS".

RECENTLY, THE RESISTANCE STARTED TO EMPLOY DEDICATED "HELICOPTER  
...HUNTING DETACHMENTS", AMBUSHING HELICOPTERS NEAR AIR BASES AND IN  
...KNOWN CHOKES. THEY ALSO OPERATE HIGHLY MOBILE DETACHMENTS IN  
...PICK-UP TRUCKS AND MOTORCYCLES.

(NOTE) 25 JUL 1967 23/16552 JUL

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THE SOVIETS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BLOWPIPE AND THE STINGER, AS WELL AS THE OTHER HIGH QUALITY WEAPONS BEING USED AGAINST THE RESISTANCE.

...IN THE EVENT OF A ...  
...LESS ...  
...ORDE ...  
...AN ...

...IS USED TO ...  
...ADDITIONAL HEAT ...  
...IN THE EVENT OF A ...  
...ANTI-SAM ...  
...PROTECTION SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN ...  
...THE SOVIETS ...  
...EXAMPLE OF HOW ...  
...GARRISON NEAR THE ...  
...CONSIDERATION ...  
...SIDE ...  
...EXPLAINED: 'THE SUN MAKES A MORE ...  
...OF AN ...  
...ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE ...

WHILE MORE AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS ARE BEING SHOT DOWN IN AFGHANISTAN, THE PRIMARY IMPACT OF THE RESISTANCE'S AIR-DEFENCE CAPABILITIES WAS A MODIFICATION OF SOVIET-DRA TACTICS. THERE ARE NOW FEWER SOVIET BOMBERS.

RESISTANCE ELEMENTS THERE IS A NEED FOR AIRPOWER, THE SOVIET AND ...  
...AT ...  
...REPEATEDLY, ...  
...BOMBERS ...

...ON ARTILLERY FOR SUPPRESSION AND ...  
...PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE ...  
...SPECIFIC AREAS, WHICH PERMITS THE ...  
...FOR THEIR ARTILLERY ...

THERE IS A MARKED INCREASE IN THE CONCENTRATION AND ...  
...SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS. THE SOVIETS ...  
...DEDICATED ...  
...BY AND LARGE, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ...  
...BECAUSE ...

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THE RESULTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE WEAPONS BY THE SOVIET-DRS TO THE RESISTANCE ARE AS FOLLOWS: THE RESISTANCE HAS BEEN WEAKENED AND THE SOVIET-DRS HAVE GAINED A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. THE RESISTANCE HAS BEEN WEAKENED AND THE SOVIET-DRS HAVE GAINED A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. THE RESISTANCE HAS BEEN WEAKENED AND THE SOVIET-DRS HAVE GAINED A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

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SINCE THE RESISTANCE IS INCAPABLE OF PROTECTING THE LOCAL POPULATION, AS WELL AS ITS OWN, THE NET OUTCOME OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE WEAPONS HAS BEEN A RUTHLESS SUPPRESSION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE RESISTANCE INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPPORTING POPULATION IN AREAS WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN LEFT INTACT.

ADMITTEDLY, MORE AIRCRAFT ARE LOST WHEN THEY RAID PAKISTANI BORDER TOWNS AND RESISTANCE SAFETY AREAS AND BASES NEAR THAT BORDER. BUT THEY STILL HIT THE BUNKER LINE AREA AND NOT RESISTANCE STRONGHOLDS IN THE DEEP INTERIOR. MORE HELICOPTERS ARE LOST WHEN THEY RAID RESISTANCE FORCES NEAR THE PAKISTANI BORDER, CLOSING THE RESISTANCE LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND KILLING ITS COMMANDERS.

THEREFORE, THE INITIAL RESULTS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF SOPHISTICATED SAMS TO AFGHANISTAN ARE A MIXED BAG AT BEST. THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET-DRS LOSSES. HOWEVER, THE MISSILES HAD NO EFFECT ON THE GENERAL COURSE OF THE WAR. (ENDALL) 25 JUL 1983 23/1914Z JUL

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